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Introduction

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) has brought job
opportunities and a brighter future to somewhere around 700,000
undocumented immigrant youth.' Yet some contend that the employment
authorization conferred upon DACA recipients renders the program
illegal, because it converts it from a mere program of prosecutorial
discretion into an ultra vires benefit.2 This essay sets aside the host of other
legal issues raised by DACA and focuses on the narrow question of
whether the federal government exceeds its statutory authority when it
confers employment authorization on DACA recipients. 3 There is a short
answer to this question that is based on the unambiguous text of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which is an emphatic no. The
relevant statute defines an "unauthorized alien" for employment purposes
to exclude anyone designated as authorized for employment by the agency;
the agency has long designated deferred action as a category authorized

Associate Professor, University of Idaho College of Law. Thanks to the editors of the Yale
Journal on Regulation for their thoughtful editing and insightful comments on this essay.
1.
Andorra Bruno, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46764, DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD
ARRIVALS (DACA): BY THE NUMBERS 9 (2021). For a discussion of the benefits of DACA to the
recipients themselves, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Demystifying Employment Authorization
and ProsecutorialDiscretion in Immigration Cases, 6 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 18-20 (2016).

2.
See Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California,140 S. Ct. 1891, 191112 (2020) (describing the rationale of Acting DHS Secretary Elaine Duke in rescinding DACA).
3.
The essay does not address the question of whether the agency's grant of "lawful
presence" causes the program to violate the Administrative Procedure Act. For a discussion of
this question, compare Michael Kagan, DAPA's Unlawful Presence Problem, YALE J. ON REG:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 6, 2016), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/dapa-s-unlawful-presenceproblem-by-michael-kagan, with Anil Kalhan, DAPA, "Lawful Presence," and the Illusion of a
Problem,
YALE
J.
ON
REG:
NOTICE
&
COMMENT
(Feb.
12,
2016),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/dapa-lawful-presence-and-the-illusion-of-a-problem-by-anil-kalhan.
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for employment, and DACA is a species of deferred action. 4 Yet some
courts have found this answer unsatisfying, referring to the provision as a
"mousehole" that pales beside the vast social and economic questions at
stake in making large numbers of undocumented immigrants eligible for
employment.5 Federal courts in Texas have enjoined DACA and a related
program called Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA)
based on their inference that a purpose of the INA is to parsimoniously
guard employment authorization as part of a broader scheme to enforce
immigration law and protect jobs for native workers.6
Recently, the government issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that
would explicitly codify employment authorization for DACA recipients.7
However, DACA applicants would no longer be required under the
proposed rule to seek employment authorization in conjunction with their
DACA applications. 8 In addition, the government contends that each core
facet of DACA is severable from the others, and that it can continue
running the program on a piecemeal basis if a court enjoins any one of
those aspects, such as employment authorization.9 Thus, at the same time
that the government would codify the various aspects of DACA to put
them on a more secure legal footing, it would also try to de-tether them so
that DACA would survive if dissected by injunction.
This new approach makes it all the more important to address the
legality of employment authorization, which is vital to DACA recipients'
livelihoods and futures. This essay argues that courts are wrong to ignore
the easy textual answer to the employment authorization question, and
goes on to explain that the relevant text makes sense in light of the broader
historical context, including a libertarian tradition for immigrant work and
heavy economic dependence on it for much of United States history. The
purposivist reasoning of the courts hostile to employment authorization for
DACA recipients is out of step with the mainstream textualist approach to
statutory interpretation. Moreover, the protectionist purpose inferred by
these courts from the INA is in tension with the broader history of work
by non-citizens inside the United States.

4.
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2021).
5.
See Texas v. United States ["Texas T'], 809 F.3d 134, 183 (5th Cir. 2015), as revised
(Nov. 25, 2015); Texas v. United States [" Texas IT'], No. 1:18-CV-00068, 2021 WL 3025857, at *24
n.37 (S.D. Tex. July 16, 2021) (quoting Texas I, 809 F.3d at 183 n.186).
6.
Texas I, 809 F.3d at 180-81; Texas II, 2021 WL 3025857 at *29-31.
7.
Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 86 Fed. Reg.

53,736, 53,756-60, 53,770, 53,772, 53,773 (Sept. 28, 2021) (creating a specific regulatory provision
allowing DACA recipients to seek employment authorization, specifying that employment
authorization will automatically terminate upon termination of a grant of DACA, eliminating the
previous requirement that DACA applicants seek employment authorization, and including a
severability section stating that DACA will stand if any of its three major components, including
employment authorization, are held to be illegal).

8.
9.

Id. at 53815.
Id. at 53816.
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I. The Agency's Authority to Regulate Immigrant Employment
President

Obama

created DACA in 2013

as an exercise

of

prosecutorial discretion after a decade of congressional near misses at
passing some version of the DREAM Act, which would have created a
pathway to citizenship for those brought to the United States at a young
age.' 0 DACA is a deportation forbearance policy for persons who might
well qualify for status if the DREAM Act eventually passes, and who
comprise a highly sympathetic group regardless of whether legislation
ultimately passes. According to the government, DACA is not an
immigration status; it is "deferred action," or a decision, in other words, to
defer removal." However, it also has come with employment authorization
and persons with DACA are considered lawfully present for certain
collateral purposes."
The Supreme Court has yet to address the questions of whether
DACA is legal or whether offering employment authorization to DACA
recipients contributes to its possible illegality. In its 2020 decision,
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of

California, the Supreme Court found that the Trump Administration's
rescission of DACA violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
because it failed to segregate the issues of granting a deportation
forbearance from the benefits associated with DACA, like a grant of lawful
presence and employment authorization.1 3 In essence, the majority
assumed for the sake of argument that a prior Fifth Circuit analysis was
correct that grants of employment authorization and lawful presence
convert a prosecutorial-discretion program into a benefit program that is
"'manifestly contrary' to the INA." 4 Assuming that to be the case, the
Court held that the government should have considered eliminating lawful
presence and employment authorization while keeping the deportation

10.

See generally Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in

Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 94-96 (2016).
11.
Id.
12.

Wadhia, supra note 1 at 6-7.

13.
14.

Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1912.
See id. at 1911-12; Texas I, 809 F.3d at 182. The Supreme Court noted that in

rescinding DACA, the Acting Secretary of DHS was bound by the Attorney General's conclusion
that the program was unlawful because "[t]he same statutory provision that establishes the
Secretary of Homeland Security's authority to administer and enforce immigration laws limits that
authority, specifying that, with respect to 'all questions of law,' the determinations of the Attorney

General 'shall be controlling."' Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1910 (citing 8 U.S.C.

§

1103(a)(1)). The

Attorney General had stated that DACA was unlawful for the same reasons that the Fifth Cirucit
had found DAPA unlawful. Id. at 1911. Since the respondents in Regents had not addressed how
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) impacted the reviewability of the Attorney General's legal conclusions
concerning DACA, the court did not review those conclusions, but instead essentially took them
as a given, and proceeded to consider whether the rescission nonetheless violated the APA
because the agency had overlooked important considerations. Id. at 1910-15.
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forbearance aspect of the program." The government violated the APA
by failing to consider this and other ways to address DACA, particularly
given the enormous reliance interests at stake.
Despite Regents and the support of the Biden Administration, today
DACA just clings to existence. Judge Hanen of the Southern District of
Texas enjoined the program in July 2021 but stayed his decision in part
while the government appeals and simultaneously works on a draft
regulation. 6 Judge Hanen first held that the government violated the APA
by failing to go through a notice and comment rulemaking process-a
defect that he acknowledged may be cured by an imminent proposal for a
DACA regulation.1 7 However, in addition to this procedural APA
violation, Judge Hanen ruled in the states' favor on a substantive APA
claim that DACA is in fundamental tension with central principles set out
in the INA.1 8 One of these, according to Judge Hanen, is that "[t]he INA

provides a comprehensive statutory scheme for the allocation of work
authorization."1 9
This is incorrect. First, a regulation has been in place since 1981
authorizing employment for deferred action recipients, and DACA is a
type of deferred action. 20 This regulation predated Congress saying
anything significant about immigrant employment, which it did not do until
1986 when it passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). 21

Second, with IRCA, Congress granted authority to the agency to offer
employment authorization to whomever it wants, ratifying the agency's
preexisting practice of granting it to persons with deferred action.
According to the INA as amended by IRCA, an "unauthorized alien" for
purposes of employment is a noncitizen who is neither a Lawful Permanent
Resident nor "authorized to be ... employed by this chapter or by the
Attorney General."22 In other words, Congress explicitly granted authority
to the Attorney General to give employment authorization to categories
of persons unmentioned in the statute. After passage of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, this function was transferred to United States

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the component of the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1912.
Texas II, 2021 WL 3025857 at *42.
Id. at *23.
Id. at *24-32.
Id. at *29.

20.

See Employment Authorization to Aliens in the United States, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,079,

at 25,081 (May 5, 1981) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 109). Today the regulation allowing for
employment authorization for persons with deferred action is 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2021)
("An alien who has been granted deferred action, an act of administrative convenience to the
government which gives some cases lower priority, [may be able to obtain work authorization
upon application] if the alien establishes an economic necessity for employment.")

21.
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §§ 115, 274A, 100
Stat. 3359, 3360, 3384.
22.
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (emphasis added); see generally Wadhia, supra note 1, at 5.
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that has inherited authority
over employment authorization.2 3
It may seem hard to understand at first glance why Congress would
draft an exception that seemingly swallowed its other rules about
immigrant employment, but that is exactly what the statute says. Under the
plain wording of the statute, USCIS can grant employment authorization
to new categories of individuals, or even dole it out to individual
undocumented immigrants on a case-by-case basis. Although this reading
may be jarring to those with a certain view of immigration enforcement,
the broader historical context offers clarity.
A.

The Tradition of Work as a Natural Right

The regulation of immigrant employment with IRCA in 1986 is a
relatively recent development in the history of immigrant work in the
United States. In order to understand why it came as late as it did, it is first
necessary to address a crucial semantic distinction. The INA regulates the
"employment" of non-citizens, and USCIS grants an "employment
authorization document" to persons who qualify for one under the
agency's regulations and policies. 24 "Employ" means to hire a person and
"employment" is central to the modern capitalist system, with its focus on
the corporation and economies of scale. "Work," in contrast, has a broader
and more basic meaning-one that hearkens back to the nation's
individualistic, agricultural, and entrepreneurial roots .2 Historically,
people in this country have long worked for themselves, on farms or in
small businesses. The founders were steeped in the philosophies of John

23.
Prior to enactment of the Homeland Security Act, the Attorney General delegated
most powers to the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 8 C.F.R. § 2.1
(2001). The Homeland Security Act transferred the Commissioner's power to adjudication
immigration applications, like applications for employment authorization documents, to the
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, which has since been renamed as United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.

107-296, § 451(b), 116 Stat 2135 (2002).
24.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (unlawful employment of aliens); 8 C.F.R.

§ 274a.12 (Classes

of

aliens authorized to accept employment); FormI-765, Applicationfor Employment Authorization,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/i-765 [https://perma.cc/4979-MB57].
25.
The relevant meaning of "employ" is "(1) to use or engage the services of (2): to
provide with a job that pays wages or a salary." Merriam Webster Online Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/employ. "Work" has a long and nuanced definition.
It can be used as a noun, verb, or adjective. As an intransitive verb, one definition of "work" is "a:
to perform work or fulfill duties regularly for wages or salary // works in publishing b: to perform
or carry through a task requiring sustained effort or continuous repeated operations // worked all
day over a hot stove c: to exert oneself physically or mentally especially in sustained effort for a
purpose or under compulsion or necessity." Merriam Webster Online Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/work. As a noun, "work" can mean "1: activity in
which one exerts strength or faculties to do or perform something: a: activity that a person engages
in regularly to earn a livelihood // people looking for work b: a specific task, duty, function, or
assignment often being a part or phase of some larger activity c: sustained physical or mental effort
to overcome obstacles and achieve an objective or result." Id.
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Locke and Adam Smith, who considered labor the foundation for property
rights, central to individual liberty. 26 Their vision of a new Republic was
built on the Lockean premise that individuals have a right to work in order
to feed themselves and their families. 27 This philosophy informed a wellestablished jurisprudence concerning an immigrant "right to work" that
both pre- and post-dated the Lochner era.2 8 During a period dating from
the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century, courts regularly struck down
state legislation restricting non-citizens' ability to work based on various
theories that were loosely connected by language concerning universal
natural rights. 29

During this period when courts were striking down state regulations
on immigrant work, the federal government had the ability to bar the entry
of foreign "contract labor" if there were enough native workers to fill the
job.30 Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the United States regulated
the admission of immigrants to protect the labor market. However, once
non-citizens arrived in the United States, their ability to work was entitled
to constitutional protection. This constitutional distinction between the
treatment of non-citizens seeking admission and those already present was
consistent with a broader trend that continues to this day. Courts regularly
defer to the federal government's regulation of the admission of noncitizens while more closely scrutinizing state infringements on the
constitutional rights of non-citizens once they are present.31
Part of the reason that the regulation of immigrant employment came
as late as it did was that the regulation was built on a libertarian tradition
of protecting the right to work of immigrant workers, at least once they
had arrived here. This ideological foundation for immigrant work was fed
by and in turn nourished the nation's massive economic dependence on
immigrant labor.3 2 Populist pressures occasionally resulted in reform, such
as the Contract Labor Law of 1885, but up until the late twentieth century,
these reforms impacted only the criteria for admission, and left in place an
essentially laissez-faire right of undocumented immigrants to work within
the interior.33

26.
80 (2017).

See Geoffrey Heeren, The Immigrant Right to Work, 31 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 243, 279-

27.
For example, Jefferson's vision of Democracy was deeply tied to the notion of
independent "yeoman farmers" who cared about the country because they cared about their own
land and the work they had done to improve it. See Lisi Krall, Thomas Jefferson's AgrarianVision
and the ChangingNature of Property, 36 J. ECON. ISSUES 131, 131-32 (2002).
28.
Heeren, supra note 26, at 252.

29.
30.
31.

Id.
Contract Labor Law of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (amended 1887).
See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary

CongressionalPower, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255-56.
32.

Kitty Calavita, The Contradictions of Immigration Lawmaking: The Immigration

Reform and ControlAct of 1986, 11 LAW & POL'Y 18, 19-21 (1989).
33.
Id. at 21.
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The Historical Origins of Regulating ImmigrantEmployment

After the Lochner era ended, courts stopped using natural rights
language to protect an immigrant right to work. 34 At the same time,
Congress and the agency began toying with some regulation of noncitizens' employment. The INA, enacted in 1951, built upon the preexisting
practice of preventing the admission of noncitizens to work in positions
that could be filled by domestic workers. 3 However, it did nothing to
prevent non-citizens from working who were present in the United States
without lawful status, and employers who hired such workers faced no
penalty. The INA made it illegal to "harbor transport, or conceal illegal
entrants," but an amendment named the "Texas Proviso" after the Texas
growers to whom it was a concession excluded employment from the
category of harboring, and was "interpreted by the INS as a virtual carte
blanche for the employment of undocumented workers." 36 After passage
of the INA,

the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

did

promulgate regulations restricting employment for some temporary visa
holders, or "nonimmigrants," if they lacked permission. 37 Yet the INS did
not appear to have a formal process for adjudicating employment
authorization until 1981 when it issued the first employment authorization
regulation-the one that recognized authority for employment
authorization for persons with deferred action. 38
Statutory authorization for this regulatory practice of restricting
employment authorization did not clearly exist until 1986, when Congress
enacted IRCA. When Congress did act, it ratified the agency's regulatory
definition of employment authorization rather than creating a new one.
This left the agency with sweeping authority over the issue, meaning that
Judge Hanen's conclusion that the INA comprehensively regulates "work
authorization" is incorrect. Rather, the INA gives the agency authority to
regulate employment authorization via its regulations and even less formal
practices.
For example, beginning in 1999, the INS began to grant deferred
action on a categorical basis to petitioners for lawful permanent residency
under the Violence Against Women Act while they waited for visas to
become available. 39 The agency has likely granted deferred action to tens
of thousands of such persons, and some of them have remained indefinitely
in the limbo of deferred action due to strict limitations on adjusting status.4 0

34.

Heeren, supra note 26, at 256.

35.

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1952).

36.

Calavita, supra note 32, at 21.

37.

8 C.F.R.

38.

Employment Authorization to Aliens in the United States, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,079,

§ 214.2(c)

(1952).

25,080-81 (May 5, 1981) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 109).
39.
Geoffrey Heeren, The Status of Nonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1152-54 (2015).
40.
Id. at 1154.
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In 2000, the agency began granting deferred action to applicants for a
special visa for crime victims called the U visa until visas were available for
them.4 ' Due to an annual cap of 10,000 U visa grants, and yearly
applications that vastly exceed that amount, the agency has recently been
granting deferred action and employment authorization to thousands of U
visa applicants each year.42
DACA therefore is only the latest example in a long history of
employment authorization being granted to large categories of deferred
action recipients. The agency has had a regulation authorizing this practice
since 1981 and Congress ratified the agency's authority to do so in 1986
with the passage of IRCA. As a result, the agency did not violate the INA
when it elected to grant employment authorization to DACA recipients.
Nor was it required to undertake rulemaking for this aspect of the
program, as a regulation already existed authorizing employment
authorization for those with deferred action. However, the agency has now
proposed adding a regulatory provision explicitly allowing DACA
recipients to seek employment authorization. 43 For all the above reasons,
the proposed regulation's conferral of employment authorization on
DACA recipients is lawful.
II.

The Myth of a Policy
Immigrant Work

to

Comprehensively

Regulate

Judge Hanen also relied on the policies he discerned behind IRCA
and the INA to comprehensively prohibit the "employment of illegal
aliens" as a means to deter illegal immigration.44 The Fifth Circuit relied
on similar logic when it struck down "Deferred Action for Parental
Accountability," another Obama Administration initiative to grant
deferred action to some undocumented parents of United States citizens
and lawful permanent residents. According to the Fifth Circuit, "[t]he
INA's careful employment-authorization scheme 'protect[s] against the
displacement of workers in the United States,' and a 'primary purpose in
restricting immigration is to preserve jobs for American workers.'"4 The
Fifth Circuit contended that the mere increase in the number of persons
with employment authorization would undermine "Congress's stated goal
of closely guarding access to work authorization and preserving jobs for
those lawfully in the country."

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

46

Id. at 1154-55.
Id. at 1155.
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, 86 Fed. Reg. 53,736, 53,740.
Texas II, 2021 WL 3025857 at *29.
Texas I, 809 F.3d at 181-82.
Id.
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As Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodrfguez have noted, it is a

dubious enterprise to try to infer any overarching policy goal from the
INA, which represents a series of accretions by different congresses with
conflicting priorities. 47 Immigration law is, as Professor Kitty Calavita says,
a "patchwork fashioned out of mutually contradictory pieces," two of the
foremost of which are "the political demand for restrictions side-by-side
with the economic reality of the need for immigrant labor." 48 These
competing demands have resulted in a Janus-faced policy concerning
immigrant work. On one side, the admission of foreign labor is regulated
and employers must check immigration status for employees; on the other
exists a vast shadowy economy in which unauthorized work is legal and
employer sanctions do not operate. This regime allows for the
perpetuation of a symbolically attractive myth that unauthorized work is
illegal while still serving the needs of the many economic sectors in which
undocumented workers form a large share of the workforce.
It is true that IRCA sought to address illegal immigration partly by
barring the employment of "unauthorized alien" workers. Yet, IRCA
sought to achieve this end by regulating employers, not workers, and the
agency has defined employment relatively narrowly. Under applicable
regulations, employers are required to check employment authorization
for "employees" but are not required to do so for "intermittent" domestic
workers and "independent contractors" "who carry on independent
business, contract to do a piece of work according to their own means and
methods, and are subject to control only as to results." 49 These carve-outs
for independent contractors and domestic workers mirror the Texas
Proviso in that they offer a significant escape valve from employer
sanctions. Add to this that employer sanctions have often not been strictly
enforced, and the result is a large accommodation for individuals and
entities to hire undocumented workers.
IRCA also continued the INA's approach of not significantly
penalizing non-citizens who seek or secure unauthorized employment,
provided they do not use false documents to do so.50 While the INA has
some penalties for unauthorized employment, they are limited and

47.

Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Presidentand Immigration Law Redux,

125 YALE L.J. 104, 151-59 (2015).
48.

Calavita, supra note 32, at 40.

49.

See 8 C.F.R.

§ 274a.1(f),

(h), and (j). The INS's proposed regulations exempted

"casual employment" as a domestic worker and working as an independent contractor.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Control of Employment of Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 8762,
8764 (1987). A definition of "independent contractor" was added to the final regulations at the
behest of twenty-five businesses that commented on the regulations. Immigration and

Naturalization Service, Control of Employment of Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,216-01, 16,219 (1987).
Although persons and companies need not check employment authorization for independent
contractors, they can be subject to liability under IRCA for hiring an independent contractor that
they know is unauthorized to work. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(4).

50.

54

See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 404-06 (2012).

Work and Employment for DACA Recipients

qualified by exceptions.5 ' Moreover, those provisions that address the issue
refer to unauthorized "employment" and not to "work." 5 2 There is no
provision of the INA that clearly prohibits a non-citizen without
employment authorization from working as an independent contractor,
from owning and operating their own business, or from farming their own
land.53
This point may strike many as jarring because it runs up against the
myth that unauthorized work is illegal.54 Contributing to this myth are the
myriad ways in which undocumented immigrants are mistreated in the
workforce and the overarching paradigm of illegality popularly attributed
to them.55 Jobs have also become a flashpoint in an economy in which many
American citizens are struggling -a theme that President Trump exploited
in his campaigns. 56 The myth of illegal unauthorized work serves a
powerful symbolic purpose in a political milieu given to regular bouts of
nativism. Yet the fact remains: no statute clearly makes unauthorized work
illegal, and no court has ever dispositively held as much. 57 Given the ability
of undocumented immigrants to legally work as independent contractors
or through self-employment, the Fifth Circuit's inference of a
Congressional purpose to absolutely ban them from being employed is a
major stretch.
Not only is Judge Hanen's inference about the INA's purpose not
borne out by history, but it is also dubious on its own terms. It is perverse
to expect that denying employment authorization to DACA recipients will
protect American workers or jobs or do anything to prevent future illegal
immigration. 58 First, it is important to recognize that DACA recipients are
51.

Heeren, supra note 26, at 267-68.

52.

See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(II)

(treating employment without authorization as

tantamount to unlawful presence for asylum applicants); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (barring a person from
adjusting status who "continues in or accepts unauthorized employment prior to filing an
application for adjustment of status").
53.
Michael Mastman, Undocumented Entrepreneurs:Are Business Owners "Employees"
Under the Immigration Laws?, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 225, 252 (2008); Heeren, supra

note 26, at 266-68. But see In re Garcia, 58 Cal. 4th 440, 462, 315 P.3d 117, 131 (2014) (noting that
the Department of Justice took the position that a non-citizen without employment authorization
could not practice law as an independent contractor).
54.
Heeren, supra note 26, at 266; see also Leticia M. Saucedo, Employment
Authorization, Alienage Discriminationand Executive Authority, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
183, 199 (2017) ("By providing employment authorization to a large number of undocumented
immigrants, the Obama administration challenged the assumption that undocumented
immigration status precluded access to all rights and benefits, even in the workplace.").

55.

Id.

56.

See Leticia M. Saucedo, Employment Authorization and Immigration Status: The

Janus-FacedImmigrant Worker, 43 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 471, 479 (2017).
57.
See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 404-06 (holding that a state provision making it illegal for
an "unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work
as an employee or independent contractor" was preempted by federal law, which does not
criminally punish unauthorized work).
58.
Professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia has broadly canvased policy rationales for
granting employment authorization to DACA recipients. See Wadhia, supra note 1, at 18-23. The
government's notice of proposed rulemaking concerning DACA addresses the labor market
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already heavily employed and deeply enmeshed in the United States
economy. 59 During the eight years they have had employment
authorization, there has been little evidence that their employment has
hurt authorized workers. To the extent that they out-competed citizens and
authorized workers for jobs, it is hard to make a moral argument that this
is wrong, since DACA recipients by and large have lived their lives in this
country and are as much a product of and contributors to it as citizens and
other authorized workers.
To take away the employment authorization that DACA recipients
have held for years would surely leave many employers in the lurch and
cause damage to the American economy. 60 It would also, as the
government notes in its proposed DACA rulemaking, "produce a great
deal of human suffering" to DACA holders themselves. 61 Would doing so
open up jobs for citizens? It is possible. But it is beyond naive to believe
that it will do much to prevent illegal immigration. The idea that jealously
guarding employment authorization will prevent illegal immigration and
preserve jobs for citizen workers ignores realities that seem unlikely to
change anytime soon. In certain sectors of the economy, such as
construction, housekeeping, agricultural work, and landscaping,
undocumented workers already comprise more than a fifth of all workers. 62
Unless Congress enacts radical change, working in one of these jobs would
probably always be an option for an unauthorized worker. Alternatively,
DACA recipients, who are often highly educated, could work in
professional jobs that sometimes involve an independent contractor
arrangement, arguably including the solo practice of law. 63
Yet what all these positions have in common is that they come without
the benefits that go with a formal employment relationship, including
minimum wage, overtime, and unemployment insurance, as well as the
protections of employment and labor laws like the Fair Labor Standards
impacts of the new DACA rule based on available economic studies that on the whole show "little
evidence that immigration significantly affects the overall employment levels of native-born
workers" and a "very small" impact of immigration on the wages of native workers, with the
largest impact falling on prior immigrants and high school dropouts. 86 Fed. Reg. 53736, 53801
(quoting National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Economic and Fiscal
Consequences of Immigration (2017), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23550/the-economic-andfiscal- consequences-of-immigration).

59.
Bill Ong Hing, Beyond Daca-Defying Employer Sanctions Through Civil
Disobedience, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 299, 302-03 (2018).
60.
Id. at 302.
61.
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, 86 Fed. Reg. at 53,736, 53,811.
62.
Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, Protecting Undocumented Workers on the Pandemic'sFront
Lines, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS tbl.
2 (Dec. 2, 2020, 9:04 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2020/12/02/493307/protectingundocumented-workers-pandemics-front-lines [https://perma.cc/MRC5-5ABR].

63.

See In re Garcia,58 Cal. 4th 440, 462, 315 P.3d 117, 131 (2014) (noting a disagreement

between the briefs filed by the Committee and Petitioner and the amicus brief filed by the
Department of Justice on the question of whether an undocumented immigrant without
employment authorization "could lawfully practice law in this country as an 'independent
contractor,' for example, as a sole practitioner.")
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Act, National Labor Relations Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act,

Family Medical Leave Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.64 Denying
employment authorization to DACA recipients will not prevent them from
legally working; it will instead prevent them from being formally
employed, and one of the main consequences of this is to deny them access
to workplace protections and benefits enjoyed by other American
workers. 65 Given that DACA recipients have commonly spent much of
their lives in the United States, they deserve these protections. Moreover,
assuring broad access to them inures to the benefit of all American
workers, since it prevents a "race to the bottom" as employers seek to farm
out work to independent contractors. 66
Conclusion

The text of the INA and its longstanding regulations authorize the
government to grant employment authorization to deferred action
recipients. Yet the Fifth Circuit in Texas I and the District Court in Texas

II divined proof of the opposite in their visions of immigration policy. The
history described in this essay is presented to refute these courts' view of
policies surrounding immigrant work. However, under a textualist
interpretation, the simple language of the statute should dispositively
clarify that the provision of employment authorization to those with
deferred action is not contrary to the INA, and thus does not support a
substantive APA claim against DACA. That leaves, then, the question of
whether the grant of lawful presence for certain collateral purposes flies so
far in the face of the INA as to render the program unlawful -a topic
beyond the scope of this essay. Other scholars have debated the unlawful
presence question, and the government's notice of proposed rulemaking
for DACA addresses it at length. 67 The government also takes the position
that if any one of the three principal aspects of the program-deportation
forbearance, employment authorization, and lawful presence-are held to
be unlawful, the remaining aspects are severable. 68 This means that a court
could find the provision of lawful presence to be contrary to the INA yet
uphold the deportation forbearance and employment authorization
aspects of the program.
With Congress deadlocked on immigration reform, the stakes for
DACA recipients and the country as a whole are profound. DACA
recipients have a legal right to work in many ways in the United States even
64.

Heeren, supra note 26, at 269-71.

65.

Id.

66.

See Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibitingthe Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants:

The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 214 (2007); Saucedo, supra note 56, at 480.
67.
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53,736, 53,760-62.
68.
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, 86 Fed. Reg. at 53,772
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without
employment
authorization.
Yet without
employment
authorization, they will be confined to precarious work without access to
protections and benefits that their classmates and colleagues enjoy. Cutting
DACA recipients off from formal employment and the protections and
benefits that go with it will do little or nothing to prevent illegal
immigration or serve any other policy goals that can purportedly be
inferred from the contradictory INA. There is little justification for
enacting this sort of caste system, and it would likely seem antithetical to
the founders who believed in a natural right to work to feed oneself and
support one's family. This same conception of individual autonomy and
personal responsibility should resonate with many conservative thinkers
today, and offers a counterweight to the policy justifications cited by some
courts for finding employment authorization for deferred action recipients
unlawful. Yet at the end of the day, the plain text of the statute itself should
validate the hard work that DACA recipients have been doing for
themselves and the country.
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